sequences, so acts can be taken to be functions from states to consequences. All uncertainty about the consequences of one's acts is carried by the states of the world. States are thus the points in the probability space associated with the model and acts can be conceived of as random variables mapping states to the utilities of the associated consequences. The expected utility of an act is then just the expectation of the act so considered as a random variable. In the special case of only a finite number of states, we can write the expected utility of an act as a probability weighted average of the utilities of application of that act to each state: SAVAGE: Utility(Act) = Si Probability (Statei) Utility (Act(Statei)).
Jeffrey allowed for the possibility that the act chosen might influence the probability of the states. He makes no formal distinction between acts, states and consequences but relies on a Boolean algebra, whose elements are to be thought of as propositions. Each proposition has a probability and each proposition with positive probability has a utility. In the application of the theory the decision maker can identify a partition of propositions that represent the alternative possible acts of her decision problem, and a partition representing alternative states of the world. Jeffrey takes the expected utility of an act to be a weighted average of the utilities of act-state conjunctions, with the weighting of the average being the conditional probability of state conditional on act instead of on the unconditional probability used in Savage:
JEFFREY: Utility(Act) The Jeffrey expected utility makes sense for any element A of the probability space relative to any finite partition {Si} whether or not the former is intuitively an act and the latter a partition of states. Furthermore, for fixed A, the expected utility of A comes out the same when calculated relative to any finite partition, thus enabling Jeffrey to dispense with a formal distinction between acts and states, and to endow all (non-null) elements of the basic probability algebra with an expected utility as well as a probability. The expected utility of the whole space is of special interest. This is the expected utility of the status quo. When the agent is undecided about which act to do, it can be gotten by expecting over the expected utilities of the acts in an act partition, so even a state of indecision is assigned an expected utility:
JEFFREY UTILITY of the STATUS QUO: USQ = Xj Probability (Actj) Utility(Actj).
However, difficulties arise when Jeffrey's system is interpreted as a system for rational decision. The probabilities in question are just the 
) Prisoner's dilemma with a clone-or a near clone-is a well-known kind of illustration of the difficulty (Lewis 1979, Gibbard and Harper 1981). Max and Moritz are apprehended by the authorities and are forced to play the prisoner's dilemma. (For biographical data see Busch 1865.)
Each is given the choice to remain silent (=cooperate) or turn state's evidence (=defect). We discuss the decision problem from the point of view of Max, but Moritz's situation is taken to be symmetrical. Max's payoffs depend both on what he does and what Moritz does, and he takes his utilities to be as given in table 2.1. Max also believes that he and Moritz are much alike and although he is not sure what he will do, he thinks he and Moritz are likely to decide the same. His beliefs do not make his act probabilistically independent of that of Moritz even though we assume that they are sequestered so that one act cannot influence the other. We have evidential relevance with causal independence. For definiteness, we assume that Max has the probabilities for joint outcomes given in table 2.2. (Thus, for example, Max's probability that he and Moritz both cooperate is 0.45, and his conditional probability of Moritz's cooperation given that he does is 0.9.)
If Max applies Savage's theory and takes Moritz's acts as constituting his own states, he will take the states as equiprobable and calculate Savage expected utility of his cooperating as (0.5) (0.9) = 0.45 and Savage expected utility of his defecting as (0.5)(1) + (0.5)(0.6) = 0.8. He will maximize Savage expected utility by defecting. This conclusion is independent of the probabilities assumed since defection strictly dominates But if Max applies Jeffrey expected utility, using conditional probabilities as weights, he will calculate the Jeffrey expected utility of cooperating as (0.9)(0.9) = 0.81 and the Jeffrey expected utility of defecting as (0.1)(1) + (0.9)(0.6) = 0.64. He will maximize Jeffrey expected utility by cooperating. Maximization of Jeffrey expected utility selects a strictly dominated act.
In response to these difficulties, Jeffrey introduced a new concept in the second edition of The Logic of Decision: that of ratifiability. (For related ideas, see Eells 1982 Eells , 1984 .) Jeffrey's idea was that during the process of deliberation, the probabilities conditional on the acts might not stay constant, but instead evolve in such a way that the spurious correlation was washed out. In other words, it is assumed that at the end of deliberation the states will be probabilistically independent of the acts. If so, the Jeffrey expected utility will be equal to the Savage expected utility. Thus, in the previous example expected utility at the end of deliberation would respect dominance and defection would then maximize Jeffrey expected utility.
Consider the probability measure that an agent would have on the brink of doing act A, and let UA be the Jeffrey expected utility calculated according to this probability. An act A is said to be ratifiable just in case: UA(A) ' UA(B) for all B different from A.
We will say that it is strictly ratifiable if the inequality is strict: The reason for talking about "the brink" is that when the probability of an act is equal to one, the probabilities conditional on the alternative acts have no natural definition. The idea of ratifiability, so expressed, is ambiguous according to how "the brink" is construed. In section 4 we specify ratifiability as an inequality holding throughout some neighborhood of the point at which the probability of the act is equal to one.
Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.
A standard model is widely used to model the dynamics of evolutionary games. Individuals can have various alternative "strategies" or dispositions to act in certain ways in pairwise encounters. These strategies are genetically determined. Reproduction is asexual and individuals breed true. Each individual engages in one contest per generation, and plays its strategy. Payoffs are in terms of evolutionary fitness (expected number of off-spring). The payoff for an individual playing strategy Ai against one playing strategy Aj is written as U(AiIAj). The population is very large (effectively infinite). Individuals are paired at random. Let us write p(A,) for the proportion of the population playing strategy Ai. This is also the probability that an individual playing Ai is selected in a random selection from the population. Then, under the foregoing assumptions, the expected fitness for an individual playing Ai is determined by averaging over all the strategies that Ai may be played against: U(A) = -p(Aj) U(Ai,Aj). The average fitness of the population U is calculated by averaging over all strategies: U = S,p(A,) U(Ai). If the population is large enough, then the expected number of offspring to individuals playing strategy A,, U(A,), is with high probability close to the actual number of offspring. The population is assumed to be large enough that a useful approximation can be derived by studying the deterministic map which identifies the expected number of offspring to individuals playing a strategy with the actual number of offspring. A dynamic equilibrium is a fixed point of the dynamics under consideration. In the case of discrete time, it is a point x of the state space that the dynamics maps onto itself. For continuous time, it is a state x = (xI, . .., xi, . .) such that dxi/dt = 0, for all i. An equilibrium x is stable if points near to it remain near. More precisely, x is stable if for every neighborhood V of x, there is a neighborhood V' of x such that if the state y is in V' at time t = 0, it remains in V for all time t > 0. An equilibrium x is strongly stable (or asymptotically stable) if nearby points tend toward it. That is, to the definition of stability we add the clause that the limit as t goes to infinity of y(t) = x. The states of interest are vectors of population proportions. We treat these formally as probabilities. Since these must add to one, the state space is a probability simplex. We will say that an equilibrium is globally stable in the replicator dynamics if it is the dynamical limit as time goes to infinity of every point in the interior of the state space.
Taylor and Jonker introduced the replicator dynamics to provide a dynamical foundation for the equilibrium notion-evolutionarily stable strategy-introduced informally in Maynard Smith and Price ( .) A specification of the number of strategies for each of the two players and the pay-off function determines the game. A Nash equilibrium of the game is a strategy combination such that no player does better on any unilateral deviation. We extend players' possible acts to include randomized choices at specified probabilities over the originally available acts. The new randomized acts are called mixed strategies, and the original acts are called pure strategies. The payoffs for mixed strategies are defined as their expected values using the probabilities in the mixed acts to define the expectation. We will assume that mixed acts are always available. Then every finite, noncooperative, normal form game has a Nash equilibrium.
For any evolutionary game given by a fitness matrix, there is a corresponding symmetric two-person noncooperative game. (It is symmetric because the payoff for one strategy played against another is the same if row plays the first and column plays the second, or conversely. The identity of the players does not matter.) If x is an evolutionarily stable state, then (x,x) is-by condition 1 above-a symmetric Nash equilibrium of that two-person noncooperative game. Condition 2 adds a stability requirement. If (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium of the two-person game, then x is a dynamic equilibrium of the replicator dynamics, but not conversely. If x is a stable dynamic equilibrium of the replicator dynamics, then (x,x) is a Nash equilibrium of the two-person game, but not conversely. (For details and proofs see van Damme 1987 .)
The foregoing model motivating the replicator dynamics relies on many simplifying assumptions and idealizations which might profitably be questioned. Here, however, we focus on the assumption of random pairing. There is no mechanism for random pairing in nature and ample reason to believe that pairing is often not random (Hamilton 1964) . Random pairing provides a certain mathematical simplicity and striking connections with the Nash equilibrium concept of the von Neumann and Morgenster (1947) theory of games, but a theory which accommodates all kinds of nonrandom pairing would be more adequate for realistic models. How should we formulate such a general theory? 4. Darwin Meets The Logic of Decision. Let us retain the model of the previous section with the single modification that pairing is not random. Nonrandom pairing might occur because individuals using the same strategies tend to live together, or because individuals using different strategies present some sensory cue that affects pairing, or for other reasons. We want a framework general enough to accommodate all kinds of nonrandom pairing.
The characterization of a state of the biological system, then, must specify conditional proportions p(AjlAi) consistent with the population proportions-which give the proportion of individuals using strategy Ai which will interact with individuals using strategy Aj. Now the expected fitness for an individual playing Ai is derived by averaging over all the strategies that Ai may be played against, using the conditional proportions rather than the unconditional proportions as weights of the average: U(Ai) = p(AjlAi) U(AIAj). Formally, this is Jeffrey's move from Savage to Jeffrey expected utility. The average fitness of the population is determined by averaging over the strategies using the proportions of the population playing them as weights: U = 2p(Ai) U(Ai). This is the Jeffrey expected utility of the status quo. The replicator dynamics then goes exactly as before with the proviso that utility be read as Jeffrey expected utility calculated according to the conditional pairing proportions.
The dynamics are complicated if the conditional pairing proportions are subject to dynamical evolution. This will often be the case in realistic models, and in certain cases may be forced upon us by the requirement that the pairing proportions be consistent with the population proportions. To take an extreme case, suppose that two strategies are initially represented in equal proportions in the population and suppose each strategy strongly tends to pair with the other. If the fitnesses are such that strategy one flourishes and strategy two is driven toward extinction, the strong anticorrelation cannot be maintained because not enough strategy-two individuals are available to pair with all the strategy-one players at a given time. No such consistency problems occur in maintaining strong positive correlations between strategies in two-strategy games. In the case just described each strategy could almost always be paired with itself. However, the specific biological motivation for correlation could easily motivate a dynamical evolution of the conditional pairing proportions in this case as well.
What are the relevant notions of equilibrium and stable equilibrium for pure strategies in correlated evolutionary game theory? Every pure strategy is a dynamical equilibrium in the replicator dynamics because its potential competitors have zero population proportion. Maynard Smith introduced the nontrivial equilibrium concept of evolutionarily stable strategy into evolutionary game theory. A strategy is evolutionarily stable if, for all potential competitors, either it does better against itself than the competitor or it does better against the competitor than the competitor does against itself. But the notion is relevant only in the context of the random pairing assumption. It does not take correlation into account. Where we have correlation, being an evolutionarily stable strategy in Maynard Smith's sense is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a dynamically stable equilibrium (as will be shown by example). We want a stability concept that gives correlation due weight, and that applies in the general case when the conditional pairing proportions are not fixed during the dynamical evolution of the population. For such a notion we return to Jeffrey's concept of ratifiability. Transposing Jeffrey's idea to this context, a pure strategy is ratifiable if it maximizes expected fitness when it is on the brink of fixation. (The population is at a state of fixation of strategy A when 100 percent of the population uses strategy A.) This means that in some neighborhood of the state of fixation of the strategy, the strategy maximizes expected utility in that state (where the state of the system is specified in the model so as to determine both the population proportions and the conditional pairing proportions).
Let us focus on models where the conditional pairing proportions are functions of the population proportions, so that the population proportions specify the state of the system and the replicator dynamics specifies a complete dynamics for the system. Since we are interested in strong stability, the natural concept to consider is that of strict ratifiability. Let x be vector of population proportions specifying the state of the system; let a be the state of the system which gives pure strategy A probability one; let Ux(B) be the expected fitness of B when the system is in state x, and U, be the average fitness of the population in state x. Then a pure strategy A is strictly ratifiable if for all pure strategies B different from A:
for all x # a in some neighborhood of a (the point of fixation of A).
There is, however, reason to explore a weaker variation on the general theme of ratifiability. Here we ask only that the expected fitness of A is higher than that of the average fitness of the population throughout a neighborhood of the point of fixation of A. What is required to hold throughout the neighborhood is not that A is optimal but only that A is adaptive, that A is better than the status quo. I will call this concept adaptive ratifiability. A pure strategy A is adaptive-ratifiable if: U,(A) > Ux for all x 7 a in some neighborhood of a (the point of fixation of A). Obviously strict ratifiability entails adaptive ratifiability since the average population fitness Ux is an average of the fitnesses of the pure strategies Ux(Bi). For an example that shows that adaptive ratifiability does not entail strict ratifiability, consider the fitness matrix in table 4.1 together with the assumption of random pairing. Then strategy 1 is not strictly ratifiable, because wherever p(S2)/p(S3) > 3, strategy 3 has higher fitness than strategy 1, and wherever p(S3)/p(S2) > 3, strategy 2 has greater fitness than strategy 1. Strategies 2 and 3 each prosper when rare relative to the other, but the rare strategy cannot make so great an impact on the average fitness of the population as the other strategy which cannot prosper. In fact, the average fitness of the population is at its unique maximum at the point of fixation of strategy 1. Strategy 1 is therefore adaptive-ratifiable.
We can extend the concept of adaptive ratifiability from pure strategies to mixed states of the population. If p is the vector of population pro- Using the payoffs for prisoner's dilemma of section 2, the expected fitnesses (=Jeffrey utilities) are: However, defection is not the only strictly ratifiable pure strategy. Cooperation qualifies as well. As the population approaches 100 percent cooperators, cooperators almost always pair with cooperators at the first stage. Defectors random pair with those left at the second stage, but not many cooperators are left. The result is that the expected fitness of cooperation exceeds that of defection. An unstable mixed equilibrium results where the fitness curves cross at p(C) = 0.75. This example illustrates a general technique for obtaining correlated pairing by superimposing a "filter" on a random-pairing model. It also shows that nothing is especially pathological about multiple strictly ratifiable strategies in evolutionary game theory. The population is finite, the dynamics are discrete and the population proportions are not sufficient to specify the state of the system. As Hamilton (1964) emphasizes, correlated interactions may take place in the absence of detection or signals when like individuals cluster together spatially. Hamilton discusses nondispersive or "viscous" populations where individuals living together are more likely to be related. In replicator models, relatedness is an all or nothing affair and the effects of viscosity can be striking. For the simplest possible spatial example, consider a one-dimensional space. A large fixed finite number of individuals are arranged in a row. Each, except those on the ends, has two neighbors. Suppose that in each time period each individual plays a prisoner's dilemma with each of its neighbors and receives the average of the payoffs of these games. We assume that similar individuals cluster, so a group expands or contracts around the periphery. The population proportions will be governed by the discrete replicator dynamics rounded off, and the expansion or contraction of a connected group of like individuals will be determined by the fitnesses of members of that group. The state of the system here depends not only on the population frequency but also on the spatial configuration of individuals playing various strategies.
U(C) = 0.9 [p(C) + [{1 -p(C)} {p(C) -p(C)2}]/[1 -p(C)2]]; U(D) = 1 -[{0.4 (1 -p(C)}/{l -p(C)2].
A single cooperator introduced into space otherwise populated by defectors interacts only with defectors and is eliminated. Scattered isolated cooperators or groups of two are also eliminated. Defection is strongly stable in a sense appropriate for this discrete system. However, if a colony of four contiguous cooperators is introduced in the middle of the space (or three at an end of the space), cooperators will have a higher average fitness than defectors and will increase. Cooperation, however, will not be fixed. The hypothetical last defector interacts only with cooperators and so has a fitness higher than their average fitness. Defectors cannot be completely eliminated. They will persist as predators on the periphery of the community of cooperators. Cooperation fails to be stable. Even though defection is the unique stable pure strategy in this example, many possible initial states of the system are carried to states that include both cooperators and defectors.
These simple models indicate the importance of correlation in evolutionary settings and the striking differences in outcomes of which it can produce. A variety of other models incorporating correlation in one way or another, and fitting within the framework of correlated evolutionary game theory, can be found in the biological, economic and philosophical literature. Some pointers to this literature are given in section 8.
Correlation in Evolutionary and in Economic Game
Theory. In the absence of correlation, the Nash equilibrium of the rational players of classical economic game theory and the equilibria of the unconscious adaptive processes of evolutionary game theory almost coincide. To every evolutionary game corresponds a two-player nonzero sum von NeumannMorgenstern game. We cannot say that p is an equilibrium of the replicator dynamics for the evolutionary game iff (p,p) is a Nash equilibrium of the von Neumann-Morgenstern game because, as already mentioned, any unmixed population (pure strategy) is an equilibrium of the replicator dynamics.2 But we can say that if (p,p) is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding two-person game, then p is an equilibrium of the replicator dynamics. And if p is a stable equilibrium of the replicator dynamics, then (p,p) is a Nash equilibrium of the two-person game. For more information on the relation of refinements of the equilibrium concepts in the two settings, see Bomze (1986), Friedman (1991), Nachbar (1990) and van Damme (1987) . On the other hand, replicator dynamics need not even converge to an equilibrium or a cycle. For a discussion of chaotic dynamics in four strategy evolutionary games see Skyrms (1992 Skyrms ( , 1993 .
In both evolutionary and economic game theory the independence assumptions of the classical theory are an unrealistic technical convenience. However, the introduction of correlation leads the two theories in different directions. In the game theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern and Nash, the choice of a mixed strategy is thought of as turning the choice of one's pure act over to some objective randomizing device. The player's choice is then just the choice of the probabilities of the randomizing device, for example, the choice of the bias of a coin to flip. The randomizing devices of different players are assumed to be statistically independent. The introduction of mixed strategies has the pleasant mathematical consequence of making a player's space of strategies convex and assuring the existence of equilibria in finite games. From a strategic point of view, the coin flip is important because it pegs the degrees of belief of other players who know the mixed act chosen. If each player knows the mixed acts chosen by other players, uses these probabilities together with independence to generate degrees of belief about what all the others will do, and if each player's mixed act maximizes (Savage) expected utility by these lights, then the players are at a Nash equilibrium.
This picture may seem unduly restrictive. Why could not some commonly known correlation exist between the individual players' randomizing devices? Players, in fact, might all benefit from using such a joint randomizing device. Or, to take a more radical line, if the only strategic 2This is because mutation is not explicitly part of the replicator dynamics, and if the initial population is unmixed, no other strategies are around to replicate. The desirable step of incorporating mutation into the model leads from the simple deterministic dynamics discussed here to a stochastic process model. See Foster and Young (1990) . The framework for correlation used in this paper can also be applied to stochastic replicator dynamics. importance of the randomizing devices is to peg other players' degrees of belief, why not dispense with the metaphor of flipping a coin and define equilibrium directly at the level of belief? From this perspective, the assumption of independence appears even more artificial. These lines of thought were introduced and explored in a seminal paper by Aumann (1974). Aumann introduced the notion of a correlated equilibrium. Think of a joint randomizing device which sends each player a signal as to which pure acts to perform. This gives probabilities over each player's pure acts but these probabilities may be correlated. Such a device represents a jointcorrelated strategy. Let us assume that all players know the joint probabilities generated by the device, but that when the signal goes out each player observes only her own signal and bases her degrees of belief about what the other players' pure acts will be on the probabilities conditional on this signal pegged by the joint randomizing device. If, under these assumptions, players have no regrets, that is, each player maximizes (Savage) expected utility, then the joint-correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium. (Aumann 1987 shows how the notion can be subjectivized and viewed as a consequence of common knowledge of Bayesian rationality together with a common prior where Bayesian rationality is taken as ex post maximization of Savage expected utility.)
Notice that the definition of a correlated equilibrium involves a weak ratifiability concept. If players are at a correlated equilibrium, then each player's act will maximize expected utility for that player after the player is given the information that act was selected by the joint randomizing device. In this sense, players only play ratifiable strategies. However, this ratifiability concept crucially differs from the evolutionary one. In Aumann's correlated equilibrium, the relevant ratifiability concept is defined relative to Savage expected utility and in the context of correlated evolutionary game theory, the relevant ratifiability concept is defined relative to Jeffrey expected utility.
Two examples illustrate what can and cannot be a correlated equilibrium. Consider the two-person game in table 6.1 where row's payoffs are listed first and column's second. Only three uncorrelated Nash equilibria of the game exist: the pure equilibria where both players play strategy 1, and where both players play strategy 2, and a mixed equilibrium where each player plays each strategy with equal probability. Given the assumption of independence, each pair of strategies is played with probability 1/4, and each player has an expected payoff of 2.5. Both players can do better than they do under this mixed strategy if they can play a joint-correlated strategy. For example, they might flip a coin and both play strategy 1 if heads comes up, otherwise both play strategy 2. This is a correlated equilibrium which gives each player an expected payoff of 3. In an even better correlated equilibrium, the joint-correlated strategy chooses the strategy combinations (2,2), (1,1) and (2,1) with equal probability. Since each player is only informed of his own pure act, he has no incentive to deviate. For instance, if row is informed that he does strategy 2, he assigns equal probabilities to column doing strategies 1 and 2 and thus strategy 2 maximizes expected utility for him. In this correlated equilibrium, each player gets an expected payoff of 3 1/3. Correlated equilibrium does not help, however, with prisoner's dilemma (see table 6.2). Whatever the probability distribution of the jointcorrelated strategy, if Max is told to cooperate, cooperation will not maximize expected utility for him. This is a consequence of two facts: (1) Defection strongly dominates cooperation. Despite whether Moritz cooperates or defects, Max is better off to defect; and (2) the relevant expected utility is Savage expected utility rather than Jeffrey expected utility. The only correlated equilibrium in prisoner's dilemma is the pure strategy combination (Defect, Defect). However, as we saw in example 1 of section 4, cooperation can be a strictly ratifiable and dynamically strongly stable strategy in correlated evolutionary game theory providing that the correlation of interactions is favorable enough. This example shows how wide the gap is between the effects of correlation in evolutionary game theory and in economic game theory. This is not to say that Aumann's sort of correlated equilibrium may not also have a part to play in evolutionary game theory, but only that the kind of correlation introduced by nonrandom pairing is different.
Efficiency in Evolutionary
Games. The example of the last section generalizes. The prisoner's dilemma has captured the imaginations of philosophers and political theorists because it is a simple prototype of a general problem. Interacting individuals who attempt to maximize their own payoffs may both end up worse off because of the nature of the interaction. Everyone would prefer to be a cooperator in a society of coop-erators to a defector in a society of defectors. Universal cooperation makes everyone better off than universal defection, but cooperation is neither an evolutionarily stable strategy of the Maynard Smith evolutionary game nor a Nash equilibrium of the associated two-person noncooperative game.
Let us consider an arbitrary evolutionary game, given by a fitness matrix, and say that a strategy Si is strictly efficient if in interaction with itself it has a higher fitness than any other strategy Sj in self-interaction: Uii > Ujj. Thus if a strategy Si is strictly efficient, a population composed of individuals all playing Si will have greater average fitness than a population of individuals all playing another strategy Sj. One version of the general problem of social philosophy in this setting is that the adaptive process of evolution may prevent the fixation of strictly efficient strategies, and indeed drive them to extinction.
One route to efficiency in evolutionary games that has attracted wide interest involves the consideration of repeated games. Consider either an infinitely repeated series of games with discounted payoffs or equivalently an indefinitely repeated series of games with some constant probability of one more play as one moves along the series. In an evolutionary setting, each encounter between two individuals is assumed to consist of just such a series of repeated games. This approach has become widely known through the work of Axelrod and Hamilton on indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. If the probability of one more play is high enough, Axelrod shows that the repeated game strategy of tit-for-tat, that is, initially cooperating and then doing what the other did the last time, is a Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) Two major difficulties, however, interfere with the repeated game approach to efficiency. One is that a wide variety of repeated game strategies-some inefficient-can be sustained in this way as equilibria in indefinitely repeated games. The second, more serious difficulty, is that the assumptions of the theorem never really apply. Individuals have some finite upper bound to their lifetimes and certainly a finite upper bound to the number of repetitions of a game with a given other individual. Under these conditions the relevant theorems fail. Tit-for-tat, for example, is no longer even a Nash equilibrium.
The discussion of this paper suggests another way to sustain effi- of strategy 1. In like manner, an excess of strategy 1 players lowers the expected fitness of strategy 1 below that of strategy 2. Thus, under the assumption that anticorrelation is maintained consistent with the population proportions, this efficient polymorphic population is strongly dynamically stable in the correlated replicator dynamics. Efficiency in polymorphic populations is, however, not always so straightforward. An efficient polymorphic population may fail to be in equilibrium in the correlated replicator dynamics, even assuming the most favorable correlation consistent with population proportions. Table 7 .2 modifies the foregoing example by enhancing the fitness of 52 played against S1. Now at a population equally divided between S1 and S2 with perfect anticorrelated interactions, the fitness of S2 is 30, that of S1 is 20, and the average fitness of the population is 25. But since the fitness of S2 is higher than that of S1, the correlated replicator dynamics causes the proportion of S2 individuals to increase. This means that there are not enough SI individuals to pair with all S2s, so some S2s must pair with each other, and the expected fitness of 52 goes down, as before. These effects come into equilibrium in a population of 1/3 SI and 2/3 52. This polymorphic population is strongly stable in the correlated replicator dynamics, but its average fitness is only 20 whereas at the (1/2,1/2) polymorphism the average fitness of the population is 25. Moreover, (1/2,1/2) polymorphic state Pareto dominates the (1/3,2/3) state in the sense that S2 individuals have higher fitness in the former, while S1 individuals have equal fitness in both.
In summary, correlation completely transforms the question of efficiency in evolutionary game theory. With perfect self-correlation the replicator dynamics inexorably drives a strictly efficient strategy to fixation-even if that strategy is strongly dominated. With other types of correlation, efficient polymorphisms are possible which are not possible without correlation. However, the mere fact that correlation must be consistent with population proportions already circumscribes the situations in which the most favorable correlation can support efficient mixed populations. In more realistic cases, correlation will fall short of extreme values. (Why this is so raises the important question of the evolution of correlation mechanisms.) Nevertheless, the novel phenomena which stand out starkly in the extreme examples may also be found in more realistic ones. 8. Related Literature. A rich biological literature, largely initiated by the important work of Hamilton (1963 Hamilton ( , 1964 Hamilton ( , 1971 but going back at least to Wright (1921) , deals with nonrandom interactions. Hamilton (1964) discusses both detection and location as factors which lead to correlated interactions. He already notes here that positive correlation is favorable to the evolution of altruism (see also Hamilton 1963 ). This point is restated in Axelrod (1981 Axelrod ( ,1984 and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) , where a scenario with high probability of interaction with relatives is advanced as a possible way for tit-for-tat to gain a foothold in a population of "always defect". Fagen (1980) This means that strategies such as cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma with a clone are converted to legitimate possibilities in correlated evolutionary game theory. It is not generally true that evolutionaryadaptive processes will lead the population to behave in accordance with the principles of economic game theory. The consonance of evolutionary and economic game theory only holds in the case of independence. When correlation enters, the two theories part ways. Correlated evolution can even lead to fixation of a strongly dominated strategy.
Positive correlation of strategies with themselves is favorable to the development of cooperation and efficiency. In the limiting model of perfect autocorrelation, evolutionary dynamics enforces a Darwinian version of Kant's categorical imperative, "Act only so that if others act likewise fitness is maximized". Strategies which violate this imperative are driven to extinction. If a unique (strictly efficient) strategy obeys it, then that strategy becomes fixed. In the real world, correlation is never perfect, but positive correlation is not uncommon. The categorical imperative is weakened to a tendency for the evolution of strategies which violate principles of individual rational choice in pursuit of the common good.
Correlation of interactions should continue to play a part, perhaps an even more important part, in the theory of cultural evolution (see Boyd and Richerson 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, and Lumsden and Wilson 1981). If so, then the special characteristics of correlation in evolutionary game theory will be important for understanding the evolution of social institutions. Contexts which involve both social institutions and strategic rational choice may call for the interaction of correlated evolutionary game theory with correlated economic game theory.
